State of Utah v. Rodger Vancleave : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
State of Utah v. Rodger Vancleave : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joanne C. Slotnick, Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; James R.
Taylor, Deputy Utah County Attorney; Counsel for Appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Vancleave, No. 980210 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1478
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RODGER VANCLEAVE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 980210-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37d-4 and -5 (1996); POSSESSION OF A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
503 (1997); UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
(1996); AND TWO LESSER MISDEMEANORS, IN THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, PRESIDING 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
JAMES R. TAYLOR 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North, P.O. Box WL" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellant 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 13 2000 
Paulette Stagg 
C1-* < 'he O u r ! 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 980210-CA 
RODGER VANCLEAVE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37d-4 and -5 (1996); POSSESSION OF A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
503 (1997); UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG-FREE ZONE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1996); AND TWO LESSER MISDEMEANORS, IN THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS, PRESIDING 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
JAMES R. TAYLOR 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON 
WHICH TO BASE HIS WAIVER OF COUNSEL, HIS WAIVER 
WAS INTELLIGENT; IF THE COURT REACHES DEFENDANT'S 
ARGUMENT THAT HIS WAIVER WAS NOT VOLUNTARY OR 
KNOWING, THAT ARGUMENT FAILS ON THE MERITS 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF COURT-APPOINTED 
COUNSEL WAS UNJUSTIFIED 6 
CONCLUSION 21 
ADDENDUM - Ruling on Motions 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
McKee ... =1=4..... J- '' '' 
U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Moore ^ ^ . a lijti stri ,_ir . . . 
STATE CASES 
C & Y Corp. v. Geneid-L Bxometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47 
(Utah App. 1995) 8 
Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608 (Utah 1995) . . . 
State v. Ami cunt' i-iH'i I1 'ii ) 
State v. Bakalo- : -99 UT 45, 979 P.2d 799 . . . 7, 15, 16, 20 
State v. Drobel, 815 e . ^^ , - J L. aii App .) , 
cert, denied, 836 P.2a 1383 (Utah 1991) 6 
State v. Frampton, 7"" ? 2d 183 :utah 19-7) " "> 
State v. Heat .:. i . . ' 
State v. McDcna,. : -.... I Id 'J" , ,1996) . . 
O Let u c: r~ u. ». c ~^  ^  r~ J.
 A . . . 
State v. Ramirez - > _d •. > n . . . 
Staic ^v-a^c^ ) 17 
2d 960 Utah ADD. 1998) 17 
15 
• < L i ' • " - •• 7) . . . 15-17, 20 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1996) 1 
XX 
te v. 
State v. 
State v. 
Vessev
w, 
Wu i f -
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-52 (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §-58-37-8(1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1996) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1997) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1997) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (Supp. 1996) 1 
iii 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Pla. i i it. i f f Appellee 
v. 
R OD 3ER VANHiRA' 'R, 
Defendant/Appellant 
BRIEF 
;T:P ISDICTION AND NATURE «DF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from, convictions for possession of a, 
clandestine ahora^ 1^ =• fA*-<~ iecjr00 felony ,:i 1:1 violation oi 
Utah Code .«- . . possession of a 
dangerous .• ^  . . . '^rnreri r&r*^ • second degree ^ I T / / , 
i .::* xA:. ... 
p o s s e s s i o n \i a se cf -. c o n t r o l l e d - u r ^ ar^:e in -i i r - j a - f r e e zone, 
a « . . . 7-
B{i a 1: (1996.); l o a a e d fir*- u r ::, . Tiotor v e h i c l e . " l a ss B 
misdemeanor 
and speeding a .:ictSf isatuuecmoj loiacior ; a;; • 1-
d Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 1996). 
: Case No. 980210-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
OF APPELLEE 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waive his right to counsel? 
Whether defendant properly waived his right to counsel 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Heaton, 958 
P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998); State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 780-
81 (Utah App. 1996)(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-39 
(Utah 1994)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions or statutes are necessary to 
the resolution of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with seven drug and firearm-related 
crimes, including three felony offenses and four misdemeanors. 
R. 2-3. He was also presented with a notice and demand for 
forfeiture of property, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 
(1996). Id. Following a jury trial at which defendant 
represented himself with an appointed public defender serving as 
standby counsel, defendant was convicted of five of the offenses: 
possession of a clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony; 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony; possession or use of drug paraphernalia in a drug-
free zone, a class A misdemeanor; carrying a loaded firearm in a 
2 
motor vehicle, a class B misdemeanor; and speeding, a class C 
misdemeanor. R. 268-70. 
The court sentenced defendant to five years to life on the 
first degree felony; one-to-fifteen years on the second degree 
felony; and one year, six months, and 90 days respectively on the 
class A, B, and C misdemeanors. The court ordered all sentences 
to run concurrent with each other but consecutive to the sentence 
defendant was already serving. R. 269. The court additionally 
ordered defendant to pay $1850 in fines, accorded him no credit 
for time served, and recommended long-term drug therapy and 
mental health counseling. Id. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A Utah County deputy sheriff, after stopping a speeding 
vehicle driven by defendant, smelled the odor of marijuana 
emanating from the .car (R. 363: 88, 90-91, 93). A subsequent 
warrants check revealed that defendant was wanted for a Utah 
parole violation and that he was the subject of an outstanding 
FBI warrant. The dispatcher "advised [the deputy] to use extreme 
caution, that [defendant] was often armed" (Id. at 121). 
Defendant was arrested. Searching the vehicle for weapons 
incident to the arrest, the deputy located a fully-loaded handgun 
under the driver's seat (Id. at 94, 96-97). He also found a full 
box of handgun ammunition, a marijuana roach, cigarette rolling 
papers, and broken glass bearing what appeared to be 
3 
methamphetamine residue (Id. at 101-04) . Later in the 
investigation, officers discovered duffle bags in the trunk of 
the vehicle containing equipment and supplies associated with a 
clandestine laboratory (Id. at 106-10) . After receiving Miranda 
warnings, defendant admitted he was transporting a clamdestine 
laboratory in exchange for payment of $10,000 (Id. at 113-14). 
Defendant was reincarcerated pursuant to the outstanding 
parole violation warrant (Id. at 114). The trial court appointed 
Steven Killpack to represent him. From the beginning, defendant 
filed pro se documents independent of those filed by his 
appointed counsel, asked that the public defender's office be 
fired, and maintained that he wanted private counsel from New 
Mexico (R. 22, 34, 38-49, 83-84, 105-06, 130, 133-48, 193-202, 
221-66, 276-77, 333) . The court repeatedly discussed the issue 
with defendant prior to trial; found no actual conflict with 
Killpack; warned defendant that he either needed to secure his 
own counsel, use the public defender, or represent himself; 
informed defendant of the seriousness of the pending charges; and 
advised him multiple times against proceeding pro se (R. 361: 57; 
R. 362: 6-13; R. 363: 14-16). Ultimately, defendant chose to 
represent himself at trial, and the court ordered Killpack to 
serve as advisory or standby counsel (R. 363: 5, 14-16, 29)-1 
1
 Killpack secured pretrial discovery, a preliminary 
hearing transcript, police reports, and crime lab reports, all of 
which he shared with defendant. Killpack also succeeded in 
4 
Continuing discussions in which the court urged defendant to use 
or consult with his court-appointed counsel punctuated the trial 
by jury (R. 363: 225; R. 364: 5, 33, 35; R. 367: 17, 19) .2 
Following trial, defendant was convicted of five of the charged 
crimes (R. 268-70) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waive his right to counsel. The colloquy and the 
extensive ongoing discussion of the matter, however, reveal that 
the court provided defendant with adequate information on which 
to base his choice to waive counsel. Consequently, the waiver 
was intelligent, as that term is used in this context. 
Defendant has only barely averred that his waiver of counsel 
was not knowing or voluntary and, for that reason alone, his 
argument may be waived. Even on the merits, the claim fails 
because an unjustified rejection of court-appointed counsel is 
properly deemed a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. 
having the marijuana re-tested at defendant's request (R. 32, 45, 
201, 330; R. 362: 10-12). Further, although Killpack did not 
argue or examine witnesses at trial, he did consult off-the-
record with defendant (R. 193-202). 
2
 The matter was also discussed at sentencing and at a 
post-trial motions hearing (R. 365: 5, 25, 32-35; R. 366: 3-4, 
16-18). 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON 
WHICH "TO BASE HIS WAIVER OF COUNSEL, HIS 
WAIVER WAS INTELLIGENT; IF THE COURT REACHES 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT HIS WAIVER WAS NOT 
VOLUNTARY OR KNOWING, THAT ARGUMENT FAILS ON 
THE MERITS BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF 
COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL WAS UNJUSTIFIED 
Defendant argues that he did not voluntarily, intelligently, 
and knowingly waive his right to counsel.3 Br. of App. at 24. 
Specifically, he contends that the colloquy initiated by the 
trial court prior to his waiver was insufficient to establish 
that he: 1)understood the seriousness of the pending charges; 
2)knew the maximum penalty he could face if convicted; and 
3)understood the actual risks of self-representation. Id. at 17, 
23-24. Given these deficiencies, defendant asserts, his 
convictions should be reversed. Id. at 17, 24. 
In the context of waiving the right to counsel, the words 
''knowing/7 "voluntary," and "intelligent" all carry specific 
connotations: 
"Intelligent" . . . means "only that the 
defendant has been provided with adequate 
information on which to make his or her self-
representation choice. Because such a choice 
is seldom, if ever, a wise one, 'intelligent' 
does not carry that meaning here." State v. 
3
 Defendant does not dispute that he waived his right to 
counsel. That is, by arguing that his waiver was not knowing, 
voluntary, or intelligent, defendant concedes that he factually 
waived his right to counsel, but that the waiver was legally 
defective because it did not comport with constitutional 
standards. .See, e.g., Br. of App. at 17. 
6 
Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 732 n.ll (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
"Knowing" refers to a defendant's competence 
to waive the right to counsel, similar to a 
defendant's competence to stand trial, id. at 
731 n.ll, while "voluntary" means "free from 
official coercion, even if not free from the 
influence of a mental disorder," id. at 732 
n.ll. 
State v. McDonald, 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah App. 1996). 
Defendant's general claim, while employing the alternative 
phraseology of "knowing, intelligent, or voluntary," is at its 
core an attack on the intelligent nature of the waiver. 
That is, defendant specifically asserts only that the trial court 
did not provide him with sufficient relevant information on which 
to base a decision to represent himself. 
The law is well-settled that the trial court must determine 
whether a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is 
intelligent. See, e.g., State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, J23, 979 
P.2d 799; State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). 
Plainly, whether a defendant has made an intelligent waiver is a 
fact-sensitive inquiry, turning on the circumstances of the 
particular case. Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. 
The preferred and most efficient way of ensuring the 
intelligent nature of a waiver is for the trial court to engage 
defendant in an in-depth colloquy on the record, fully informing 
defendant "of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that he knows 
7 
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Id. at 
187 (citations omitted). While Frampton provided a sample 
colloquy of inquiries, the court made clear that defendant's 
background, while relevant to assess his capability to waive 
counsel, "is not relevant to show whether a sensible, literate, 
and intelligent defendant possesses the necessary information to 
make a meaningful decision as to waiver of counsel." Id. at 188. 
The responsibility both for providing the necessary 
information to defendant and for deciding whether the waiver is 
intelligent rests, as it should, with the trial court, which -
"having the benefit of questioning the defendant and observing 
his demeanor" - is optimally situated to evaluate the factual 
circumstances prompting the waiver. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 
911, 918 (Utah 1998); cf. C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, 
Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah App. 1995)(citing State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)(reviewing court defers to trial court 
on credibility matters because trial court has observed 
"witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application 
of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record 
available to appellate courts"))• From a policy perspective, a 
record colloquy makes good sense because it documents the waiver 
inquiry and ensures that the reviewing court will not usurp the 
trial court's role by scanning a cold record and fabricating an 
8 
intelligent waiver out of whole cloth.4 
In this case, defendant concedes that the trial court 
engaged in a colloquy but asserts that the colloquy was 
insufficient in and of itself to establish the intelligent nature 
of his waiver. Br. of App. at 23. Here, however, in addition to 
the colloquy, the trial court engaged defendant in a pattern of 
conversation over several hearings, exploring defendant's desire 
for substitute counsel and the relationship of defendant's 
insistence on substitute counsel to waiver of counsel and self-
representation.5 Because the supreme court's concern that a 
reviewing court not usurp the proper role of the trial court is 
not implicated here, neither Heaton nor the reasonable policy 
underlying it precludes looking at the record as a whole to 
4
 Thus, the court in Heaton observed that, in the absence 
of any kind of meaningful inquiry into the circumstances 
surrounding a waiver, a reviewing court should be "reluctant to 
assume the important responsibility which has been placed upon 
the trial court" by reviewing the record de novo. Heaton, 958 
P.2d at 918. 
5
 Contrast both Frampton and Heaton, where the trial court 
had wholly failed to ensure that defendant's waiver of counsel 
was intelligently made. In Frampton, when defendant asserted 
that he wanted to represent himself, the court merely advised him 
that he had a constitutional right to do so and then appointed 
standby counsel. Frampton/ 737 P.2d at 186. In Heaton, 
following a hearing at which both defendant and his counsel 
acknowledged a "rift" between them, the court advised defendant 
of his right to self-representation, refused to allow counsel to 
withdraw, required counsel to continue on in a "standby" capacity 
despite the articulated rift, and told defendant that he "was 
free to choose to handle trial matters on his own but that the 
court would make a record of Heaton's decision to proceed pro 
se." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 914. 
9 
supplement the trial court's colloquy with defendant. 
Furthermore, the law is well-settled that "this court upholds the 
trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record 
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually 
made such findings." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 n.6 
(Utah 1991). 
First, from the record of defendant's pretrial conference, 
it is clear that defendant knew the maximum penalty he faced if 
convicted. In asserting that he wanted different counsel due to 
a conflict of interest, defendant stated: wI'm fixing to go to 
trial on five to life, and I don't even have a defense" (R. 362: 
7). Shortly thereafter, once again requesting new counsel, 
defendant stated: "I need somebody that is going to represent me 
on these five to life" (Id. at 8). Later in the same hearing, 
the trial court clarified that "on these first degree felonies . 
. . you could spend the rest of your life in prison, Mr. 
VanCleave. . ." (Id.). That defendant understood the maximum 
sentence is attested to by his subsequent comment: "I would like 
another attorney, a different attorney . . so I don't have to 
spend the rest of my life in Utah State Prison" (Id. at 9) . 
Later, defendant reminded the court, "You know, you're aware that 
I'm trying to fight for the rest of my life here, your Honor" 
(Id. at 10) . 
Second, as to the seriousness of the pending charges, during 
10 
the same exchange, the trial court stated to defendant: 
It's my understanding, Mr. Roger VanCleave, 
at each and every stage of these proceedings 
I have attempted to appoint counsel for you, 
advising you that Count I is a first degree 
felony, Count II is a first degree felony, 
Count III is a second degree felony, 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. Count IV is possession or 
use of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor. 
Count V is a class A misdemeanor, Count VI is 
a loaded firearm in a (inaudible) vehicle, a 
class B misdemeanor, Count VII is a 
misdemeanor . . . and at each and every stage 
of these proceedings I have indicated to you, 
'You need counsel.' 
Id. at 7. To this litany, defendant responded, "Correct," 
reflecting his clear understanding of the gravity of the charges 
(I£J • 
By the time of trial, the court had discussed the issue of 
substitute counsel and the alternative of pro se representation 
with defendant on multiple occasions (R. 360: 39-40; R. 361: 57; 
R. 362: 8-13). Immediately before trial began, the court once 
again engaged defendant in conversation to resolve "a critical 
issue before we proceed" (R. 363: 15). The court reiterated that 
it did not recommend that defendant proceed pro se, once again 
highlighting the severity of the charges: "I've told you at all 
stages of this case that these are serious charges, and that I 
think your case is best served by having a seasoned expert . . . 
to be your advocate in this case. That has been my 
recommendation at all stages. I don't depart from it now" (Id. 
11 
at 16) . Plainly, defendant was cognizant of the seriousness of 
the pending charges. 
Third, defendant was well aware of the risks of self-
representation. "Of all the guidelines recommended in Frampton, 
the court's recommendation against self-representation probably-
best ensures the defendant will understand the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation." McDonald, 922 P.2d at 
785. In this case, the trial court amply fulfilled its 
responsibility. During the colloquy on the morning of trial, the 
court told defendant that if he chose to proceed pro se, he would 
be the only spokesperson for the defense: he would call, 
interrogate and cross examine witnesses; he would offer an 
opening statement and closing argument (R. 363 at 14-16). The 
court told defendant to confer with his standby counsel 
throughout the proceedings, consult with him on procedural 
matters, and ensure that all relevant inquiries had been explored 
in direct and cross examination (Id. at 16) .6 The court also 
admonished defendant that self-representation was not a good idea 
and that he strongly recommended against it (Id.). 
6
 These statements implied that defendant needed to comply 
with procedural rules. During the trial, suggesting once again 
that defendant use his attorney, the court explicitly stated: 
"This court has an obligation and responsibility to rule based 
upon the rules of evidence. And my rulings have been consistent 
with the rules of evidence. I will give you leave to consult 
with your attorney, or to please reconsider and have your 
attorney conduct the cross-examination, please" (R. 364: 33-34). 
12 
Throughout the trial, the court periodically highlighted the 
risks of self-representation, urging defendant to reconsider his 
decision to waive counsel. Thus, the court closed the first 
day's proceedings by stating: 
We're going to end the day the way I started 
the day, and that is to impress upon you, Mr. 
Rodger VanCleave, the benefits that could 
come from having Mr. Stephen Killpack 
represent you as an attorney, both as to 
motions, as to objections, as to cross-
examination. You would be well served to 
consider your decision to represent yourself. 
That's the way I started the day, that's the 
way I'm ending the day. 
(Id. at 225) . The court opened the next day's proceedings in 
much the same way, encouraging defendant to use his court-
appointed counsel and informing him that although he had the 
right to represent himself, he did so "at [his] own peril and 
[his] own risk" (R. 364: 5). The court repeated its admonitions 
to defendant periodically throughout the proceedings (R. 364: 32-
35; R. 367: 17, 19; R. 365: 25; R. 366: 3, 16).7 
7
 During a post-trial motions hearing, defendant questioned 
whether he had been informed of the pitfalls of self-
representation. The court responded: 
Didn't this court at every stage recommend 
that you utilize the services of Mr. Killpack 
who is a competent and capable and 
professional attorney, who is also the 
Director of the Public Defender's Office. He 
has the most experience of any attorney 
within the office. Frankly, may have as much 
courtroom experience as all of the attorneys 
put together within that office. Now I 
advised you at every stage and recommended 
13 
Finally, defendant's insistence on substitute counsel 
evidences his awareness of the risks of self-representation. 
Indeed, the very fact that defendant repeatedly renewed his 
demand for substitute counsel demonstrates that he knew he needed 
counsel to represent him. Thus, at his pretrial conference, when 
the court raised the issue of self-representation, defendant 
unequivocally stated, "I'm just asking for a different attorney. 
I'm asking you for a different attorney. I need somebody that is 
going to represent me on these five to life . . . I'm not arguing 
the fact that I want to represent myself" (R. 362: 8). This 
statement illustrates that defendant was fully aware of the 
gravity of the proceedings against him, and clearly understood 
both the risks of proceeding pro se and the advantages to be 
gained from having an attorney represent him. 
Defendant's dogged insistence on substitute counsel is 
important for a second reason, wholly apart from its evidentiary 
value in demonstrating his knowledge of the risks of self-
representation. Indeed, defendant's persistent demands for 
substitute counsel go to the very heart of this case, to an issue 
that you use Mr. Killpack's services. I 
think it is disingenuous to say at this stage 
that this court did not advise you relative 
to the issues of pitfalls. That is 
disingenuous. 
R. 366: 16. 
14 
defendant has implicated only by the bare assertion that he did 
not voluntarily waive his right to counsel. 
At its crux, defendant's underlying argument is that his 
waiver of counsel was not voluntary because the trial court's 
refusal to appoint substitute counsel gave him no choice but to 
represent himself. Because defendant has not supported this 
argument with any legal authority or argumentation, however, this 
Court may decline to consider it on appeal. State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984). 
To the extent that this Court chooses to consider 
defendant's unadorned claim that he did not voluntarily waive his 
right to counsel, that claim must fail. Utah courts have long 
treated an unjustified rejection of court-appointed counsel as a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 
120 n.4; State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1987). 
Certainly, a defendant has the right to either employ his own 
counsel or, if indigent, be represented by a court-appointed 
attorney. However, 
he does not have an immutable right under the 
sixth amendment of the United States 
Constitution or under our state constitution 
to reject court-appointed counsel for the 
purpose of forcing the court to appoint 
private counsel of his own choice to 
represent him, absent a showing of good cause 
15 
for such a change. [9] 
Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d at 121; accord Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, J20 
n.4. 
A showing of good cause puts a heavy burden on a defendant, 
who must do more than merely show that he does not have a 
"meaningful relationship" with his counsel or does not get along 
with his counsel. Indeed, defendant must show that "the 
animosity resulted in such a deterioration of the attorney-client 
relationship that the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel was imperiled." Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 622 
(Utah 1995); accord State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 
App. 1987). Further, the animosity or conflict must not "be 
based solely on the defendant's illegitimate complaints or 
8
 That defendant was trying to force the court into 
appointing substitute counsel of his choosing is clear from the 
record. During a motions hearing, defendant made one of his 
numerous requests for substitute counsel, arguing that his court-
appointed attorney was not properly representing him (R. 360: 6-
9, 33, 35-36). Pursuing the matter, the court queried, "Do you 
believe that would be resolved by appointing other counsel?" (Id. 
at 8). Defendant responded that it would (Id.). The court then 
asked, "And if that counsel believes that your motions are not 
meritorious, then what?" (Id.). Defendant replied, "Then I'll 
ask for different counsel" (Id.). Despite the court's repeated 
explanations, defendant simply would not accept any counsel's 
obligation, as an officer of the court, to exercise independent 
legal judgment over defendant's asserted claims. 
Notably, defendant's manipulative behavior has continued on 
appeal, with defendant filing several letters directed to the 
court complaining of appellate counsel's failure to pursue what 
he believes are meritorious issues. 
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subjective perception of events." State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 
382 (Utah App. 1997); accord Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274. 
The determination of whether a defendant's complaints about 
appointed counsel amount to good cause for appointment of 
substitute counsel rests "within the sound discretion of the 
trial court." Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at 121; accord Pursifell, 
746 P.2d at 272. Of course, in exercising that discretion, the 
trial court must make some "meaningful inquiry" into the 
circumstances prompting the request. State v. Vessev, 967 P.2d 
960, 964 (Utah App. 1998). Examining the cause of the breakdown 
in an attorney-client relationship is pivotal to determining 
whether the court is constitutionally required to appoint new 
counsel. Scales, 946 P.2d at 382. 
In this case, the trial court inquired repeatedly and at 
length into the circumstances prompting defendant's persistent 
requests for new counsel. Defendant first raised the issue at 
his preliminary hearing. R. 359: 70, 73. Because defendant made 
his request only after all parties were present in the courtroom, 
the court proceeded with the scheduled hearing, noting that the 
record of the hearing would be available for later review by 
defendant's new attorney. Id. at 78. 
In a subsequent motions hearing, after defendant renewed his 
request, the court reiterated the conditions under which it could 
appoint substitute counsel: 
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Defendant: The only way I could get other 
counsel is to hire them 
myself, correct, your Honor, 
to pay them myself? 
Court: Yes, sir, or if there is a 
conflict of interest as it 
relates to matters. But I 
haven't seen that to this 
point in time. And there's no 
allegation relative to that. 
Discuss these matters with Mr. 
Killpack. He is competent, 
capable legal counsel. . . . 
Sit down with him. 
R. 360: 40-41 (emphasis added). The next hearing addressed 
defendant's suppression motion. At that time, defendant informed 
the court that he wanted appointed counsel to represent him (R. 
361: 3) . 
At a final pretrial conference, defendant asserted that he 
had a conflict of interest and again asked for new counsel. R. 
362: 6. The following exchange documents the issue: 
Defendant: I'm asking for a new attorney 
at this time, your Honor. 
He's not working for me, your 
Honor. . . . I've asked him 
for numerous copies of 
reasonable demands, reasonable 
demands, your Honor, 
reasonable demands of an 
attorney. I've asked him for 
fingerprints on this evidence, 
I've asked him for an 
evidentiary hearing, I've 
asked him for cross 
examination on these 
witnesses' hearsay testimony, 
and this man just isn't here 
for me, your Honor. 
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Defense cnsl: I'm unaware of a conflict, Judge. 
Court: Nor am I. 
Id. Defendant then reiterated that he wanted a different 
attorney and that he did not want to represent himself because 
the charges were so serious. Id. at 8, 9. Defense counsel 
interjected: 
We did have a discussion one other time about 
the way public policy and statutes require 
the appointment of counsel under the contract 
that Utah County has chosen to go forward, 
and the nature of the conflict of interest, 
so that has been discussed with [defendant] 
both on and off the record, and it was my 
understanding that he didn't care to have me 
represent him, but that we were unable to 
identify a legal conflict of interest. 
Id. at 9-10. The court agreed with defense counsel's 
perceptions. Id. at 10. 
When defendant persisted in his claim that counsel was not 
representing him adequately in his "fight for the rest of [his] 
life," defense counsel responded that all of defendant's issues 
"that I feel have a legal basis we've explored to their full 
capacity."9 Id. at 11. 
After further discussion, the court finally ruled, WI 
9
 As an example of his counsel's lack of representation, 
defendant cited defense counsel's failure to pursue his request 
to re-test the marijuana seized by the police. R. 362: 11. 
Hearing this, the prosecution volunteered that defense counsel 
had called three times during the previous week on the matter, 
and that the State had stipulated to the re-testing. Id. 
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decline your request for the appointment of different counsel. 
Mr. Killpack is capable, competent counsel, he has handled 
numerous felonies and numerous felony jury trials before, and I 
think what you're going to have to do, sir, is to cooperate with 
Mr. Killpack." Id. at 13. The court also reduced its ruling to 
writing, concluding that "the defendant refused his court-
appointed counsel for unjustified reasons and, therefore, waived 
his right to counsel.'7 See R. 330-31 or addendum A. 
In context, the trial court's ruling on defendant's request 
for substitute counsel reflects a correct legal judgment that 
defendant had not demonstrated a conflict of interest with his 
court-appointed attorney and that, consequently, he had not shown 
the necessary good cause for appointment of different counsel. 
See Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at 121. Where, as the court found 
here, a defendant unjustifiably rejects court-appointed counsel, 
such action is properly deemed a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
counsel. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 J20 n.4; Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at 
121; United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1980); McKee v. 
Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 930-31 (2nd Cir. 1981). As a result, if 
this Court chooses to consider defendant's argument that he did 
not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, that 
argument fails. 
20 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 13 day of September, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
H/n^_ C MfiJc__ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
RODGER VANCLEAVE, 
Defendant(s). 
RULING ON MOTIONS 
Case No. 971400387 PS 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Lynn C. Davis 
presiding, on the 30th day of December, 1997. The Defendant was 
present, in person, appearing pro se with Steven B. KillpacJc, public 
defender, as standby counsel. The State was represented by Deputy 
Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor. The Court considered a number 
of pleadings filed by the Defendant following the jury verdict 
rendered on August 27, 1997. The Defendant was again admonished to 
use the services of appointed counsel following which the Defendant 
indicated a desire to argue the motions himself and agreed that Mr. 
KillpacJc could remain as standby counsel for the hearing. Being 
advised in the premises, the Court orders the following: 
Notice of Intent to Appeal dated 11/11/97 
The Court notes that the notice is properly filed and is a first 
step to perfection of an appeal of the verdict of the jury and the 
sentence of the Court. Conflicts counsel Margaret Lindsay has been 
appointed to represent the Defendant in the pursuit of his appeal and 
for all proceedings hereafter. 
Motion for New Trial date 11/10/97 
This motion consists of two arguments. The first is that 
statements of the Defendant were allowed into trial in violation of 
his rights under the 5th amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The second is that the Defendant was not allowed to have substitute 
counsel appointed, forcing him to choose between Mr. Killpack or 
appearance pro se. 
The Court has already considered and ruled upon the 5th amendment 
claim. The Court allowed the Defendant to object to the introduction 
of the statements during the trial and considered evidence on the 
request to suppress the evidence. The Court found that the Defendant 
was properly advised of his rights per the Miranda decision, waived 
those rights and made the statements introduced as evidence. The 
Defendant has offered nothing beyond his continued denial that he was 
advised of or waived any rights or made any statements. The motion to 
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exclude is denied. If the motion is a request for a new trial based 
on a claim that the first trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by 
the introduction of the testimony, that motion is also denied. 
The Defendant does not have the right to select appointed counsel 
to represent him. This Court has carefully monitored discovery and 
pre-trial preparation in this case through a series of pre-trial 
meetings and hearings. This Court has monitored the progress of this 
case and Mr. Killpack1s efforts and concludes that Mr. Killpack has 
made every effort and attempt to conscientiously represent the 
Defendant. When the Defendant indicated a desire to have an attorney 
other than Mr. Killpack the Court attempted to understand the reason 
and found no defensible basis for the request. Communication, even if 
difficult because of the Defendant's imprisonment, has continued 
through this case. The Defendant and Mr. Killpack have consulted 
freely and often during all hearings including the trial of this 
matter. Actions taken or not taken by Mr. Killpack with respect to 
evidence and witnesses have been justifiable and understandable trial 
strategies. When the Defendant elected to represent himself pro se 
rather than have Mr. Killpack speak for him the Court repeatedly urged 
the Defendant to use Mr. Killpack instead. Moreover, Mr. Killpack 
remained as a resource for the Defendant to consult at the order of 
the Court. This Court concludes that the Defendant refused his court 
appointed counsel for unjustified reasons and, therefore, waived his 
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right to counsel. 
Second Motion for New Trial dated 11/10/97 
This motion is a re-statement of the challenge to the 
introduction of the incriminating statements of the Defendant made 
during trial and during the motion addressed above. This Court has 
found that the Defendant was advised of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at the appropriate time and made the 
incriminating statements after a knowing waiver of those rights. As 
an issue of fact, the Court has rejected the Defendants claims that 
the warnings were never given and the statements never made. The 
second motion is denied. 
Motion for Lower Degree of Offense dated 11/10/97 
The Court treats this as a motion under U.C.A. Section 76-3-402, 
(1953) as amended. The Court finds that the Defendant has been on 
probation, parole or in custody since 1989 on a variety of serious 
offenses including forgery, possession of controlled substances and 
burglary. He has a demonstrated history of abuse of controlled 
substances leading, by his own admission, to the commission of a 
number of criminal offenses. The history and character of the 
Defendant do not support a reduction in degree of offense under the 
statute. 
The character and nature of this crime also do not support a 
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reduction. Even if viewed in it's most benign characterization, what 
was done here was the transportation of equipment with the intended 
purpose of allowing someone to manufacture methamphetamine. While 
that was being done the defendant had a loaded .357 magnum handgun at 
his feet. He is or was an admitted user of methamphetamine. The 
Defendant acknowledges that the use of methamphetamine has led him to 
be involved in substantial amounts of criminal conduct. The 
transportation of the equipment necessary for a "lab" to create 
methamphetamine is a critical part of the overall production of a 
substance that has the potential for similar conduct from large 
numbers of customers who would receive the drug which would eventually 
be made and sold. This Court views this offense as a very serious 
offense with significant potential for harm to the citizens of this 
state and patently rejects the argument that the degree of offense 
should be reduced because of the nature of the offense committed. 
The Defendant's motion for a reduction in categorization of 
offense is denied. 
Uotion for a New Trial (Sufficiency of the Evidence) 
dated 11/10/97 
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that proof of any one of the 
subsections (i) through (v) of U.C.A. section 58-37d-3(1)(b) may 
establish or prove a "clandestine laboratory operation". Moreover, 
proof of knowing or intentional violation of any one of the 
subsections (a) through (g) of U.C.A. section 58-37d-4(l) is a 
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violation of the act. The jury was instructed accordingly. The 
evidence in this case supported the juryfs conclusion that the 
defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed laboratory equipment 
or supplies (58-37d-4(1)(b)) with intent to "engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation" by transporting supplies and/or equipment for 
the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine (58-37d-3(l)(b)(ii)). The 
transportation was committed in conjunction with the possession of a 
firearm, properly making the offense a first degree felony under 
U.C.A. section 58-37d-5(l)(a). The Defendant's motion for a new trial 
or a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict based upon 
sufficiency of the evidence is denied. 
Motion for a New Trial dated "September, 1997" 
This is a motion based upon a claim that certain witnesses' 
testimony should have been compelled by the Defense or that because 
evidence from these witnesses is now available, a new trial should be 
granted under a theory of newly discovered or availaible evidence. The 
motion is denied under either theory. 
The Defendant describes 4 sources of evidence that he says should 
have been arranged for and presented on his behalf by Mr. Killpack. 
They include testimony from "Joan", purported to be the owner of the 
car he was driving who would claim ownership of the car and its 
contents and exonerate the Defendant from knowing or intentional 
possession of the laboratory equipment; testimony from a Utah State 
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official regarding the treatment of evidence and the destruction of 
seized laboratory equipment and supplies; proof of a release from 
parole issued by the State of New Mexico; and, finally, testimony from 
the registered owner of the handgun recovered from under the driver's 
seat of the car the Defendant was driving. 
Mr. Killpack proffered that an attempt was made to locate "Joan" 
before the trial began but she could not be found. In any event, the 
type of testimony suggested by the Defendant would have required her 
to surrender herself to the jurisdiction of Utah courts and confess to 
a very serious crime. There is no method by which either the State or 
the Defense could have compelled that kind of testimony. Moreover, 
even if "Joan" had appeared and testified that she owned the car and 
the laboratory, it is unlikely that a different verdict would have 
been rendered. Personal property that the Defendant admitted owning 
and placing in the car trunk was next to the partially opened bags 
containing the laboratory equipment. A recipe for the production of 
methamphetamine was tucked with correspondence directed to the 
Defendant above the sun visor in the passenger compartment of the car. 
The Defendant admitted that he was being paid cash to transport the 
lab to Ogden.A Moan* wasn't present when the car was stopped. She 
could never testify as to what the Defendant knew or didn't know, 
intended or didn't intend. Whatever she owned or whatever stake she 
may have had in the events, the evidence was that the Defendant 
knowingly and intentionally participated in the transportation of the 
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laboratory equipment with the requisite intent• 
Mr. Killpack did not err in not compelling the testimony of 
"Joan" since he could never have compelled her testimony and was not 
given sufficient information to locate her in any event. Even if her 
testimony were now available, which the Defendant has failed to 
demonstrate to be the case, it is unlikely that a different verdict 
would result upon a re-trial. 
The testimony of the proposed expert from the State lab Team, 
Clark Lund, would have been cumulative and would also not lead to a 
different verdict. Experts from the State Crime Lab did testify at 
the trial of this matter and were questioned extensively about 
procedures and policies regarding evidence and destruction of 
evidence. The testimony of the expert witnesses regarding the 
destroyed evidence consisted of their view of photographs of the 
evidence seized and reading a list of items seized made at the time of 
seizure. There was no chemical testing or scientific evaluation of 
the evidence that was admitted. (Marijuana was seized and tested but 
the jury acquitted the Defendant of the charge of possession of 
marijuana. A substance suspected of being the precursor ephedrine was 
tested and determined to not be ephedrine leading to the dismissal, 
prior to trial, of the precursor charge.) Even if Mr. Lund were to 
testify that the officers violated procedure in destroying the 
equipment seized rather than preserving the items for use at trial, 
such a breach would not have justified exclusion of the photographs or 
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written lists and descriptions of the seized evidence. The officers 
who seized the items and the experts who concluded from the 
descriptions that the items were laboratory equipment were cross-
examined by the Defendant and challenged about the destruction of the 
evidence. The same cross-examination would have been conducted had 
Mr. Lund testified. In any event, the Defendant has never proffered 
or demonstrated that Mr. Lund would testify that any procedures were 
violated. The best evidence before this Court is that all proper 
procedures were followed. It is, therefore, extremely unlikely that 
the testimony of Mr. Lund would result in a different verdict were the 
case to be re-tried. 
The evidence relating to a release from parole by the State of 
New Mexico would have been irrelevant in this trial. The evidence was 
that the Defendant was a parolee from the State of Utah. The State of 
New Mexico had no legal authority to release the Defendant from his 
Utah parole. He was arrested on a parole warrant. His parole was 
revoked and he was transported from the Utah State Prison for all 
proceedings in this case after his initial bail hearing. He still has 
not obtained or shown any kind of release from parole to this Court. 
Even if he has or can obtain a parole release from the State of New 
Mexico, a new trial in this case would not be justified since such a 
document would not produce a different result. 
Finally, any testimony of the owner of the gun would be 
irrelevant and would not produce a different result in a re-trial of 
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this case. The Defendant testified that he had seen the gun under the 
driver's seat before he was stopped by the officer. The issue in this 
case was possession of the gun, not ownership. Clearly, at the time 
of the stop, the owner did not possess the gun. Either the Defendant 
possessed the gun or no one did. The issue hangs on what the 
Defendant knew and intended. The owner of the gun, whoever that may 
be (the Defendant has never identified that person), would be 
incapable of explaining what the Defendant knew or intended. The 
testimony would have added nothing to the trial and does not justify a 
new trial. 
The evidence described by the Defendant in this motion does not 
support a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial since it 
is either still not available, speculative or irrelevant. None of the 
evidence would likely have produced a different result at the original 
trial nor does it justify a new trial. The Defendant's motion is 
denied. 
Motion to Dismiss based upon 120 Day Notice 
This motion was made at the beginning of the trial of this case 
and renewed, in writing, following the jury verdict. The notice was 
not properly addressed to the prosecutor's office and, although there 
is proof of delivery to the County, there is no proof of delivery to 
the Utah County Attorney's Office. The notice does not completely 
describe the crimes charged. After sending the notice, the Defendant 
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agreed to a series of court dates and a continuance to accommodate N 
Defense motions. The trial date of August 26 was the first open trial * V 
JSo*\e. j/at*J> /iru /***/* +s*"4 M^e**~ /v-> &,',*&* /.?<?«4*y^ 
date available to counsel and the Court. At no time during any of the \ 
pre-trial hearings on April 14th, 21st, 28th, June 12th or July 1st did >^  v 
X . * 
the Defendant attempt to bring the 120 day notice to the attention of > ; 
$ * \ 
the Court or the prosecution. The Court finds that the failure to try * ^  
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this case until less than two weeks after 120 days following the 
notice sent by the Defendant was based upon good cause because of the 
congestion of the Court's calendar. Furthermore, the Defendant waived 
the requirement by failing to object to the dates set for 
consideration of defense motions and the date set for trial. The Court 
incorporates, by reference, the findings previously made on this 
issue. The motion to dismiss was and is denied. 
DATED this 27 day of Januaif$7 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
LYflN W. DAVIS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MARGARET LINDSEY 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
VSAJJAAC^ 
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